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Abstract 
In this article I seek to de-tether the idea of agency from the epistemic pursuits of philosophers and 
legal scholars working on adaptive preferences and moral responsibility. What is common to such 
scholars is a move away from conceptualising agency as individual acts of conscious deliberation. 
While I support a shift in the way agency is understood, I do not find in their work an account of 
locating and promoting agency as a primary good. For instance, while findings from various 
psychological sciences are endorsed for their objective findings on individuals, there is little guidance 
on what such findings mean for how people negotiate social spaces. As a first step, I suggest that an 
appropriate paradigm for agency would be responsiveness rather than adherence to responsibility.  I 
then proceed to identify properties of a responsiveness paradigm, concentrating on transpositional 
deliberation, mediation and intelligibility.   
Keywords 
Agency, adaptive preferences, Behavioural Law and Economics, positional objectivity, responsibility, 
rule of law 
 
  
Table of contents 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1 
VIEWING AGENCY FROM ‘SOMEWHERE’ ...................................................................................... 2 
The issue of adaptive preferences ....................................................................................................... 2 
Arpaly, Sen and Sunstein on agency ................................................................................................... 3 
Legal institutions and the possibility of agency .................................................................................. 7 
AGENCY AS RESPONSIVENESS, NOT ADHERENCE ......................................................................... 8 
THE EXERCISE OF AGENCY ........................................................................................................ 11 
Transpositional agentic deliberation.................................................................................................. 13 
Mediating dispositions ...................................................................................................................... 15 
The issue of intelligibility.................................................................................................................. 16 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 18 
 
 
 1 
Introduction1 
‘Agency’ is a word that easily lends itself to scholarly commentary and exploration. All disciplines 
that deal with the human condition – whether they are categorised as humanities or legal studies or 
natural sciences or social sciences – have something to say about this word. Given this tremendous 
amount of interest, there could be two possibilities in taking the discussion forward on agency – the 
first is that given the plethora of meanings, the word has little utility as an abstract term. If that is the 
case, rather than attempting to discern its true meaning, a more meaningful exercise in empirical 
research or informed commentary would be to populate it with particulars in order to say something 
useful. The second possibility is to see if agency does serve an organisational purpose: in the event 
things can be said or understood under the shadow of a coherent concept of agency, then it may make 
sense to retain its position as an abstract concept. To attain and maintain the position of a general 
concept, it needs to have a meaning that is coherent. Or at the very least, its features or components 
must be intelligible to observers and users, irrespective of their subjective positions. The first option – 
of viewing agency as a category to be populated by particulars – is a tempting alternative; to resist the 
inclination to generalise based on preconceptions is one of the crucial political lessons of the twentieth 
century. There is, however, a difficulty in adopting this tack. As we shall see, there is a certain 
conceptual understanding of agency that animates empirical and rigorous theoretical work on agency. 
To put it in a sentence, there seems to be a preference for viewing agency as a characteristic or set of 
traits that satisfies moral responsibility. I find this way of thinking about agency intuitively 
problematic; when I try to ‘feel’ the significance of the word ‘agency’, it gains currency as a 
phenomenon that makes an individual or a collective assert their place in the world. In this article, I 
want to flesh out this intuition; and to do so, I try to locate it within the work of scholars who have 
also been occupied with the concept of agency. Such an endeavour does not involve an exhaustive 
review of what everyone says about agency. Rather, I draw on an approach taken by Miranda Fricker 
and Martin Krygier; scholars who speak to different communities, but have a similar understanding of 
the intimate relationship between method and practice regarding the issues they write on.  
Fricker, known primarily for her work on epistemic injustice, has recently turned her attention to the 
idea of blame, culminating in a recent ‘paradigm based explanation’ of the concept of blame.
2
 She 
moves away from the traditional philosophical practice of providing a genealogical account of blame, 
and ‘imagines her way’ into a paradigmatic ‘portrait of the practice of blame.’ This allows her to 
arrive at a conception of ‘Communicative Blame’ that is not restricted to whether blame is good or 
bad, but one that serves an instrumental function of increasing ‘the alignment of the blamer and the 
wrongdoer’s moral understandings.’ Krygier’s legal scholarship has concentrated on conceptualising 
the Rule of Law. In his framework, Rule of Law is an ‘in so far as’ reality that can be observed in a 
social setting,
3
 where the Rule of Law can be said to exist in so far as there is no arbitrary exercise of 
power, including the possibility of contesting the exercise of power. In articulating this conception of a 
‘Rule of Law’ reality, Krygier clarifies that he follows a ‘teleological rather than an anatomical 
approach’ to the Rule of Law, and it is this teleology of being free of the arbitrary exercise of power 
that defines his scholarship. In both these two accounts, the properties of blame and the Rule of Law 
are intimately linked to the conceptual paradigms in which they are situated. The two conceptual 
paradigms articulated are teleological in nature, as against being genealogical or anatomical. 
                                                     
1
 This paper greatly benefited from the comments of the participants of the 2015 Human Development and Capability 
Association Conference (Washington, 11 September 2015). I also wish to thank Richard Bronaugh, Ance Kaleja, Dimitry 
Kochenov and Lien Pham for their insightful comments.   
2
 Miranda Fricker, What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation 9 NOÛS 1 (2014).   
3
 Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles about the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where? and Who Cares? 50 NOMOS 64 (2013). 
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Following their lead, I seek to articulate a paradigmatic conceptualisation of agency as responsiveness, 
and subsequently adopt an anatomical approach to identify properties of such conceptualisation.   
Much like Fricker and Krygier, the way I can explain my conceptualisation is to distinguish it from 
other scholarly frameworks. This endeavour is primarily motivated by my apprehension that in some 
of the leading accounts of agency, the concept of agency is subsumed into other concepts such as the 
enhancement of autonomy and the achievement of well-being, and does not have a voice of its own. 
While agency is conceptualised as being instrumental to the attainment of primary goods such as 
autonomy or well-being, it is not viewed as a primary epistemic good. Why is this a problem? Without 
going into the theoretical value of exploring the politics of representation as an end in itself, I find that 
there is an implicit ‘adherence to responsibility’ paradigm within which agency is conceptualised. For 
instance, in discussions on agency by legal scholars working on Behavioural Law and Economics 
(BLE), findings from various psychological sciences are endorsed for their objective findings on 
individuals. While such findings are utilised to design policies, there is very little guidance on what 
such findings mean for how people negotiate social spaces and collective choices. This illustrates why 
I think some conceptualisations of agency are privileged over others, and that identifying and seeking 
alternative characterisations is a valuable exercise. To this end, I first situate conceptualisations of 
agency in the Capability Approach to Human Development (CA), philosophical compatibilism, and 
BLE. I then advocate a conceptual shift in viewing agency as responsiveness rather than adherence to 
structures within which individuals operate, using the distinction between Law and the Rule of Law as 
an analogy. Subsequently, I identify three features of an ‘agency as responsiveness’ paradigm – 
deliberation, mediation and intelligibility. 
Viewing agency from ‘somewhere’ 
The issue of adaptive preferences 
When I know what I value and I cannot achieve it, then the CA steps in and says that the point of any 
external intervention
4
 is to assist with converting my ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ into achievements.5 Ideally, 
I should know what I want and how to achieve it, but not have the wherewithal or support system to 
do so. The CA takes into account the possibility that this conversion process is not always simple. If I 
am a producer of maize and I wish to earn from it, all it might take is a safe paved road to sell my 
produce in the nearest profitable market. Sometimes the problem may be more structural, such as the 
need to negotiate with middle-men who like to hoard food and enhance prices. The structural problems 
may not always be identifiable; perhaps I am unaware that the demand for maize is about to take a 
downturn due to a case pending at the World Trade Organisation, or due to economic recessions 
occurring in complex ways in faraway lands. To identify such complex mediators is a compelling task 
and it is not difficult to see why policy-makers and social scientists need to step in.  
The value of deliberating on ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ – or choosing to be or do – in this framework is not 
unconditional; questions regarding choice and control point to the libertarian limits of the CA. 
Suppose I wish to sell maize to subsidise a narcotics business I’ve been itching to start, then would it 
                                                     
4
 There is no escaping an external standpoint in the CA even if the focus is not policy-design; the discipline of evaluation is 
inevitably invoked to address the conceptual and empirical questions that inform the CA. Sen speaks about the discipline 
of evaluation in relation to comprehensive outcomes in Amartya Sen, Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason, 97 
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 477 (2000). The fact of conceptualising an individual and how she may get the most out 
of her life implies that we adopt an epistemic standpoint to situate the individual within public spaces. This does not 
mean, however, that the CA necessarily substitutes the judgement of the individual: just because we speak about an 
individual does not mean we speak in place of an individual. However, as we will see, identifying Adaptive Preferences 
potentially has the danger of conflating the two.  
5
 For the centrality of this idea to the CA, see Amartya Sen, Development as freedom (2001).  
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make sense to mobilise public funds to build a road for my benefit? Or take the example that’ll help 
me launch into what I wish to concentrate on: Suppose I’m a woman and I need to produce maize to 
disproportionately feed my husband and undernourish myself, then would you consider my ‘beings’ 
worthy of achievement? You may say that if my husband beats me up if I don’t feed him 
disproportionately, then perhaps I need to first free myself from coercion before I can ‘be’. But what if 
(i) I feed him disproportionately to keep him happy so he might agree to my attending night-school?
6
 
Or, what if (ii) he doesn’t beat me at all, but I feel obligated to feed him disproportionately? In both (i) 
and (ii), one thing is clear: your diagnosis may not be right about what I value and why I value them. 
You could interject by saying that though there’s no physical harm or coercion, (ii) is worse than (i) as 
I don’t really know what I want, and I’m simply perpetuating oppression. But if I don’t know what I 
want, then is there any point in deliberating about my beings and doings?  
By highlighting the possibility of an AP, Martha Nussbaum attempts to salvage the property of 
deliberative democracy that lies at the heart of the CA.
7
 The fact that some preferences may seem 
coerced or inauthentic does not necessarily do violence to the importance of deliberation. But once we 
start questioning some preferences, the obvious discontent is: where do we stop? Suppose I want to 
earn and undernourish myself not to feed my husband or start a narcotics business, but because I want 
to drink in peace, or one day buy a computer to watch pornography? Are my preferences then 
spurious? This is why scholars such as Bina Agarwal and Uma Narayan find Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
work respectively somewhat patronising – the politics of representation are not adequately negotiated 
as they substitute the judgement of the subjects they study with their own.
8
 Serene J. Khader has relied 
on feminist theory to arrive at a nuanced view of AP, arguing that the relationship between AP, agency 
and autonomy can be assessed in terms of a concept of common good.
9
 I wish to complement such 
work here, but find it meaningful to look at agency as a good in itself. I suggest that the spirit of AP –
that we cannot take ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ or deliberation about ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ as a good in 
itself – tries to address something meaningful drawing on the limits of a libertarian approach to 
individual engagement. I view AP as a ‘wound’ of the CA that allows us to reconsider the epistemic 
orientation of the CA itself, and re-orient it in terms of agency.  
Arpaly, Sen and Sunstein on agency 
In the writings of philosophers engaged in action theory or philosophical compatibilism, agency seems 
to serve an instrumental purpose in the fulfilment of moral responsibility. The reason behind the 
instrumentality of agency assessments appears to be an epistemic one: when we try and assess the 
value of someone’s preferences, the standpoint we adopt is our understanding of morality, and we 
accordingly levy praise or blame. And then we see whether someone has moral agency to the extent 
she satisfies, or has some sort of access (through thoughts, actions, emotions, stimuli) to such morality. 
A compelling account of this way of reasoning is championed by the contemporary compatibilist 
                                                     
6
 Bina Agarwal has argued an odd preference (more specifically, an overt act of compliance) does not necessarily imply the 
absence of agency, and could be a covert act of resistance. Bina Agarwal, Bargaining and Gender Relations: Within and 
Beyond the Household, 3 Feminist Economics 1, 22-25(1997).  
7
 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (2001). 
8
 This is akin to the difficulty Sugden has with Sen’s work as well, but only when Sen’s broader engagement with CA was 
interpreted as a way to identify particular capabilities by scholars such as Nussbaum. Mozaffar Qizilbash, Sugden’s 
Critique of Sen’s Capability Approach and the Dangers of Libertarian Paternalism 58 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
ECONOMICS 21(2011). As Sugden says: “The idea that ‘we’ ethical theorists can claim to know better than some 
particular individual what is good for her seems to open the door to restrictions on freedom.” Robert Sugden, What We 
Desire, What We Have Reason to Desire, Whatever We Desire: Mill and Sen on the Value of Opportunity 18 Utilitas 33, 
34 (2006).  
9
 Serene J Khader, Must Theorising about Adaptive Preferences Deny Women’s Agency? 29 Journal of Applied Philosophy 
302 (2012); Serene J Khader, Adaptive Preferences and Procedural Autonomy, 10 Journal of Human Development and 
Capabilities 169 (2009). 
Suryapratim Roy 
4 
philosopher Nomy Arpaly, who argues that a person may have moral agency even without deliberative 
access to such agency.
10
 Her primary example is Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn who rescues a black 
man despite his conscious deliberation; the words he has at his disposal to assess the situation exhort 
him otherwise as they are shaped by his racist environment. Conversely, one could be blamed for 
racist acts despite non-racist deliberations. Accordingly, a person may be held responsible for her 
actions based on subconscious moral agency. I do not necessarily disagree that a person may be held 
responsible for acts that do not have the weight of deliberation behind it; that would require a more 
nuanced view. My intervention is limited to the suggestion that irrespective of where we stand on the 
relationship between deliberation and responsibility, the attribution of responsibility should not be 
mistaken for the presence of agency.
11
  
 A person may be held morally responsible for spurious choices (and then required to correct them or 
be labelled as a person with odd preferences) depending on how such preferences are sized up. But to 
consider the attribution of such responsibility as the same as praising or blaming someone’s agency 
can lapse into an exercise in solipsism. As Fricker argues, judgements of blame are historically 
relativised, and any meta-ethical room for moral judgement ‘stops short of blame.’12 To clarify, 
Fricker (as with other scholars sceptical of philosophical exercises in holding others blameworthy
13
 or 
praiseworthy) does not suggest that we do away with locating and attributing responsibility. Rather, 
the suggestion is that the attribution of both blame and responsibility is based on considerations that 
are not characterological, but on whether they ‘promote good or ill.’ The considerations may be 
justified on the basis of constructive functionality; for Fricker, blame allows for an expansion of ‘the 
wrongdoer’s moral understanding’ to allow for a ‘proper grasp of the perspective of the wronged 
party.’14 Philosophers such as Tamler Sommers complement this view: even when internalised by an 
agent, responsibility may ‘express solidarity, love, loyalty, courage, and moral commitment.’15   
The attribution of responsibility (either blame or ‘public responsibility’16) is a process of 
objectification
17
 – that may be functional or constructive – and if we were to view agency as 
                                                     
10
 Nomy Arpaly, Merit, Meaning and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will (2006); Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: 
An Inquiry Into Moral Agency (2003).  
11
 Elinor Mason finds that in Arpaly’s account, “although acting against one’s best judgement can be for the best, and may 
well exhibit a good moral character in some sense, we should not say that it is rational” (emphasis added). Elinor Mason, 
Rationality and Morality: Thoughts on Unprincipled Virtue, 134 Philosophical Studies 441, 441 – 442 (2007). I would 
extend this line of reasoning to agency as well. This connection would be evident if we identify agency with the capacity 
to reason (such an account is found in Michiru Nagatsu, Social Nudges: Their Mechanisms and Justification, 6 Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology 481(2015)), but it is more nuanced if agency does not have to be collapsed into the capacity 
to deliberate, as is explored in the course of this article. However narrowly or broadly we might view agency, I do not see 
any reason why someone who ‘exhibits a good moral character’ should be found to possess agency. Arpaly’s distinctive 
position of viewing agency in terms of ‘moral worth’ is evident in her reviews of other philosophers working on agency. 
Nomy Arpaly, Review of ‘Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency’, 120 Philosophical Review 607(2011).  
12
 Miranda Fricker, The Relativism of Blame and Williams’ Relativism of Distance, 84 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume 151, 152 (2010).  
13
 Sceptical and metasceptical accounts of blame have been mooted by Bernard Williams, Shaun Nichols, Tamler Sommers, 
Saul Smilansky, among others.   
14
 Fricker, supra note 2.  
15
 Tamler Sommers, Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 202 (2012).  
16
 Iris Young argues that individual responsibility can be justified as political responsibility drawing on power and privilege, 
but it is difficult to attribute such responsibility in all cases; simply put, ‘we lack good conceptual tools for thinking about 
individual responsibility in relation to structural social processes.’ Iris Marion Young, Responsibility For Justice, 144 
(2013).   
17
 The attribution of legal responsibility is no different. J.H.H. Weiler shows how the European Union ‘re-objectifies’ 
individuals located in Member States. J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos’: The Individual as Subject and Object and the 
Dilemma of European Legitimacy 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 94, 102 (2014). He also suggests that 
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instrumental to attributing responsibility, then that would imply that a perfectly objectified person has 
perfect agency. The CA or AP theory would do well to steer clear of philosophical accounts that 
collapse agency into responsibility, but rather focus on AP as a heuristic device to identify and correct 
structural oppression. Attempts have been made by Amartya Sen and Cass Sunstein to guard against 
collapsing agency into a solipsistic attribution of praise or blame. I seek to show below that despite 
their considerable efforts to free agency from narrow or solipsistic ends, they have particular ideas of 
agency to conform to certain epistemic preferences. 
The adoption of an external position to expose the limitations of subjective experience and choices is 
central to Amartya Sen’s entire oeuvre: Sen argues that it is possible to arrive at an account of 
positional objectivity of an agent without going into subject-relative choices of agents. The way such 
positional objectivity acquits itself from charges of ‘intellectual despotism’18 is by taking pains to 
chart out the transpositional objectivity of an impartial observer who studies the positionality of 
agents. The transpositional objectivity and impartiality is gauged by the openness of observers in their 
attempt to reach ‘comprehensive outcomes’, deviating from monological accounts of utilitarian 
‘culmination outcomes’ prevalent in welfare economics. The comprehensive account of choices is 
understood as being composed of three elements: (1) the state of affairs that will emerge from a 
choice, (2) the role of agents’ responsibility in the choices made, and (3) value accorded to relations 
with particular people affected by such choices and acts. It is in relation to (2) that Sen uses the term 
agency (‘his own agency and his consequent responsibilities are momentous’19) to demonstrate that 
viewing an outcome as a mere culmination of choices without the contributory or participatory 
element is insufficient. This is in keeping with Sen’s careful de-tethering of agency from well-being; 
agency should not be subsumed into the assessment of well-being.
20
 But how is agency objectively 
assessed if we were to move away from subjective perceptions? Specifically, what transpositional 
roles are occupied by an impartial observer to provide an account of agency?  
Sen does not provide an explicit answer in this regard, but it appears that the legitimacy of a 
transpositionally objective account lies in its ability to appreciate and achieve counterfactual choices, 
i.e. ‘what one would have chosen if one had the choice.’21 Maintaining the centrality of counterfactual 
choices, Sen argues that freedom from epidemic diseases enhances our well-being as well as our 
agency. The latter because such freedom allows us to lead the lives we would choose to lead.  In a 
footnote, Sen says that if one has ‘the odd preference’ for having an epidemic disease, then it would 
not be served by a policy that appreciates and achieves counterfactual choices. In such a case, such an 
odd preference has to be ‘reasonably defendable.’22 Though an explicit connection is not made, it 
seems that a preference that cannot be reasonably defended would be an AP; there appears to be no 
method of distinguishing a preference for malnourishment or a preference to have an epidemic disease 
from an objective standpoint, as they can both be assessed to be ‘odd’ if they are not ‘reasonable’. The 
word ‘reasonable’ here would necessarily be defined by the interpreters of the common good who 
would circumscribe the language and channels of contestation according to whether standards of 
reasonableness are satisfied. It is unclear why an objective account of agency should aim at the 
satisfaction of a counterfactual account of freedom rather than shaping the epistemic basis and 
(Contd.)                                                                  
‘effective democratic control’ may relax the position of the individual as an object of the law, but how that is to be done 
is not clear as no thick account of democracy is forwarded.  
18
 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom, 95 (2002).  
19
 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 214 (2009).  
20
 Amartya Sen, Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 The Journal of Philosophy 169 (1985). He 
clarifies and develops some of the idea in Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-examined (1992). 
21
 Ibid, at 67.  
22
 Ibid, at fn. 14.  
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interpretation of the counterfactual.
23
 If we were to pursue the latter, then a transpositional standpoint 
would involve identifying mechanisms of rendering intelligible why choices may be considered to be 
odd, and how to defend such choices before those who determine whether they are reasonable, and if 
possible, alter the transpositional epistemology of reasonableness.  
Having said the above, I think Sen does elsewhere implicitly deal with an idea of agency that lies in 
transpositionally exposing ‘objective illusions’.24 To do so, he looks at dissonance between self-
assessed life-expectancy and observed lifespan rates of people in different Indian states, and finds that 
people in Kerala perceive a much lower life-expectancy than the (relatively high) actual lifespan. On 
the other hand, people in Uttar Pradesh (that has a low lifespan rate) perceive a higher life-expectancy 
rate. Sen suggests that this dissonance may be explained by literacy: Kerala has a much higher literacy 
rate and therefore does not suffer ‘the illusion of low morbidity’. It could be suggested that people in 
Kerala are as ignorant of reality as people in Uttar Pradesh, and the ‘positional objectivity’ of both 
people in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh is illusory. However, the illusion of the Keralites appears to help 
them live longer. Thus, if the culmination outcome is to live longer, then it could be argued that 
literacy endows Keralites with the ability to develop a functional illusion. In a similar vein, Sen notes 
that Indian women perceive a higher life-expectancy than their predictable lifespan that can be 
attributed to a deprivation of education and the normalisation of gender inequality. Per Sen, it appears 
that a transpositional account that may be accessed through education could inform women about the 
reality of their lifespan and even perhaps the reasons behind their misperceptions. This, to my mind, is 
Sen’s account of agency: information obtained from a transpositionally objective source may lead to 
revisions in one’s deliberation (and women may have a better hold on their social positions) and may 
also lead to a non-deliberative ‘drive’ to achieving better outcomes (as with Keralites). If I may put it 
this way: information may allow individuals to dispel and/or use their illusions. However, it is not 
clear how and what information may enhance one’s agency. Further, I suspect the reason Sen 
considers some preferences and illusions to be ‘odd’ but does not devote his energies towards how 
they may be ‘reasonably defended’ is because underlying transpositional objectivity is social choice 
theory that seeks to arrive at a morally defensible account of interpersonal comparisons of choices, and 
the term ‘agency’ is understood by virtue of its association with social choice theory. A particular way 
of interpreting agency in keeping with epistemic preferences is found in BLE scholarship as well.   
While BLE scholars do not ferret out transpositional objectivity and impartiality, their motivation is 
also to ‘make life better’ for people despite themselves. The basis of BLE is that given people make 
choices that are not in their best interests, such choices should be ‘nudged’ or influenced without being 
too interventionist, or following a ‘libertarian paternalist’ approach.25 Sunstein; the most prominent 
legal scholar and policy-advisor working on BLE; chalked out the political appreciation of preferences 
prior to his recent scholarship with social psychologists and behavioural economists, arguing against 
upholding endogenous private preferences as a public good. In arguing that ‘a democracy should be 
free and is perhaps obliged to override private preferences in cases of ‘collective judgements’, ‘intra-
personal collective action problems’ and notably, preferences that have ‘adapted to undue limitations 
in available opportunities or unjust background conditions,’26 Sunstein refers to and proceeds along 
Sen’s line of thought. However, in his recent scholarship on BLE, he has extended his argument for 
guiding all choices, rather than only those that are ‘adapted to undue limitations’ as he argues 
                                                     
23
 Sen provides no interpretative space for shaping the counterfactual; clarifies that it is important to subscribe to ‘conformist 
rules’ to communicate ‘non-conformist proposals’; ideas need to be ‘readily understood in terms of old rules of 
expression.’ SEN, supra note 16, at 122.  As we shall see below, agency may be found in the clarity of and the ability to 
adapt to ‘conformist rules’. But it would be difficult to accept why agency needs to be confined to such an account 
without further argumentation.  
24
 SEN, supra note 18, at 471 – 475. 
25
 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 University of Chicago Law Review 
1159 (2003). 
26
 Cass Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, 5 – 6 (1991).  
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(drawing primarily on the findings of social psychologists on the ‘reality’ of how choices are made) 
that all preferences are inevitably circumscribed.
27
 Given that all choices are inevitably shaped by 
extraneous factors, there is an argument to be made for ‘benevolent paternalism’ of all choices. But on 
what basis should we decide on when and how to interfere? Per Sunstein (as is true for the entire 
canon of BLE and behavioural economics), it is to (i) defer to the expertise of some psychologists and 
economists who can translate such expertise into behavioural models;
28
 (ii) but such deference is 
legitimate only when both the autonomy and welfare of individuals are satisfied.
29
 The way autonomy 
is furthered, or democracy is kept alive, is by allowing people to ultimately make choices for 
themselves; the point of regulation is to ‘nudge’ such choices keeping in mind the aim of making life 
better. Sunstein convincingly defends the idea of securing welfare and preserving autonomy by 
replacing invisible social influences by explicit regulatory nudges.  
While Sunstein’s account responds to the non-deliberative satisfaction of consumer welfare or 
protection from risk, it sorely misses an account of agency. Discussions on agency are located within 
the tension between autonomy and welfare,
30
 and hence agency is not afforded a meaning of its own. 
This is observable from Sunstein’s unconvincing responses to the charge that regulation along the 
lines of BLE infantilises people,
31
 and makes them beholden to scholars and regulators. Behavioural 
economics on its own does not have the epistemic tools to pronounce on issues of agency such as self-
legislation or how external intervention can enable responsiveness; Daniel Kahneman, arguably the 
leading figure in the canon of behavioural economics, notes that despite a lifetime of research, ‘…my 
intuitive thinking is just as prone to overconfidence, extreme predictions, and the planning fallacy as it 
was before I made a study of these issues.’32  
Both Sen and Sunstein are fans of democracy and of deliberation. Having said that, in their accounts, 
people’s subjective situations may be judged to be spurious by objective impartial observers, and 
shaped by regulation to satisfy welfare. Unlike Arpaly, they seek to adopt a ‘view from somewhere’;33 
this ‘somewhere’, however, is not premised on an account of agency. What is missing is an account of 
how it may be possible to agentically deal with APs rather than condemn them; it would be preferable 
to think about an AP as the result of unresponsive agency.  
Legal institutions and the possibility of agency  
The reference to corrections and objective counterfactual policies invoke the possibility of an 
institutional response, and given that formal legal institutions are tasked with maintaining social order 
and preserving deontological values, it behoves us to consider the role of law. The desirable role of 
                                                     
27
 I am not alone in this view of the change in Sunstein’s scholarship; see Mozaffar Qizilbash, Informed Desire and the 
Ambitions of Libertarian Paternalism, 38 Social Choice and Welfare 647(2012).  
28
 A normative position that Sunstein maintains is the importance of expertise in informing moral decision-making, including 
expert determination of ‘the will of the people’. However, Sunstein provides no theory of how experts may be identified 
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law in the CA would be to function as the mediator that converts beings and doings into achievements; 
for BLE, it would be securing welfare without the necessity of agents having direct control. In Sen’s 
general philosophy, an institutional intervention may be justified in situations where people sacrifice 
control over their lives without losing freedom.
34
 This way of reasoning is akin to Joseph Raz’s 
Normal Justification Thesis: Law is the mediator that people employ to achieve the ends that they have 
reason to value.
35
 Once such employment is put into effect, then per the Pre-emption Thesis, people 
sacrifice some reasons in favour of law. Unlike philosophical accounts of adherence to moral 
responsibility, law’s ‘intellectual despotism’ is easier to digest because law’s transpositional 
objectivity is theoretically legitimate. Thus, following Raz, we allow law to judge us and hold us 
responsible because structurally the law looks after us. Individual enjoyment of institutional praise 
(say for instance subsidies for using renewable energy or tax cuts for charitable donations) or blame 
(all forms of punishment and fines) operate under the shadow of legal responsibility.  
Admittedly, we cannot assume that the law and legal institutions would exist only to make our (the 
reader would surely enjoy the scope for abuse in defining the term ‘our’) lives better. But what Raz 
highlights is the possibility of assessing the legitimacy of law, and contest the law or any legal 
institution should that not be the case. There is a reason why Raz’s position has been characterised as 
philosophical anarchism; there is an assumption that there is no apriori obligation to obey the law. 
Theoretically, if there is any other collective enterprise or institution that can help us fulfil what we 
want better than the law can, then we would do better to subscribe to such an enterprise. Practically, in 
order to do so, law has to be overcome. If we are really upset with the law, then an insurrection may be 
warranted. On a smaller scale – and what actually goes on in legal systems that allow for the 
contestation of decisions made by legal institutions – the law is interpreted in a manner to 
accommodate some preferred understandings of what the law should be like. This is why in critiquing 
the CA, constitutional law scholars are puzzled by why proponents of the CA do not pay sufficient 
attention to the role of authority in shaping preferences and fulfilling capabilities.
36
 If we were to agree 
with Raz that for law to be law, it needs to be a legitimate authority, then the implication is that there 
could be other authorities assessed to be legitimate that shape our preferences and mediate their 
fulfilment. I seek to show that the assessment of legitimacy need not be a deliberative enterprise, but 
rather the deliberation lies procedurally in identifying an enterprise, institution, person, or even body 
of knowledge – any mediator – as authoritative. So this suggests that agency to deal with collective 
life does not need to collapse into responsibility. As a next step, I want to shift from the identification 
of the properties of agency to its characterisation: I seek to characterise agency as the faculty of 
responsiveness. Riding on such characterisation, an essential property of agency would be to facilitate 
responsiveness to responsibility rather than the imposition and determination of responsibility.   
Agency as responsiveness, not adherence 
The idea of AP has been subject to empirical scrutiny
37
 and subsequent analytical scrutiny of the 
empirical findings.
38
 There is one empirical study that I wish to engage with to highlight the 
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theoretical issues that deserve an interrogation of agency. Willy Oppenheim studied the demand for 
girls’ schooling in rural Pakistan; to this end, he interviewed consenting parents and their daughters 
about how they value schools and what they learn.
39
 Several responses were evidently gendered, 
where teenage girls and their parents felt that boys should learn things that prepared them for the 
world outside, and girls should inculcate values that prepared them for the household. Further, 
Oppenheim concentrates on one case where a mother felt her daughter should pursue higher studies 
for reasons intimately linked to ‘a pragmatic assessment of family needs’ rather than ‘any ideal of 
individual freedom.’40 This same mother also believed that education would allow her daughter to 
have opinions regarding marriage and family. Unless the mother is rationalising her gendered opinion 
and we cannot trust her (that is a distinct possibility), it seems that freedom and privileging of family 
interests can be compatible. There is another instance of an articulate girl with opinions on equality, 
but who is nonetheless prepared to give up her school for marriage as even her desire for schooling is 
a desire of her father’s, and should he make a marriage request, she would comply.  
Drawing on AP theory, if we were to categorise the responses of the teens as gendered, coerced, 
choice-deflating, then they would be adaptive. As AP theory does not have an account of non-
deliberative choices or inconsistent deliberation, we are unsure what to make of the inconsistent 
responses. Oppenheim suggests that rather than viewing such responses as adaptive, perhaps it is 
important to reconsider the assumptions of AP theory itself, and consider viewing the privileging of 
family interests over individual interest as authentic preferences made by autonomous individuals. But 
does that mean all opinions voiced by the respondents should be respected? Or is there something to 
Sen’s view that we may get accustomed to a ‘limited life’ and take pleasure in choices borne out of 
oppression?
41
 Khader breaks this impasse by disassociating AP from a conception of ‘real’ procedural 
autonomy, and arguing that a preference may be assessed to be adaptive if it does not correspond with 
a conception of what is good.
42
 So there is no denying we size up people’s preferences, but the 
standpoint for doing so is neither our subjective understanding of what is good nor an objective 
account of the individual’s internal processes. Thus, neither self-appointed moral police nor a 
nefarious neurosurgeon can impose a conception of AP. Rather, those who seek to instrumentally 
assess preferences for satisfying a conception of the good must base their transpositional standpoint on 
APs with regard to the satisfaction of what is good, and disregard some preferences accordingly. 
Khader’s account refreshingly clears the patronising air around AP by disassociating choices and 
autonomy. In this regard, Khader’s account corresponds with the work of Peter Strawson who sought 
to offer an ‘objective attitude’ to understanding an individual where someone’s actions or opinions43 
are either appreciated or criticised without praising or blaming the ‘real self.’   
However, such an account should not be mistaken for an account of agency, and I suggest it is 
worthwhile to have a conception of agency as an integral part of a conception of the good. My chief 
concern with the politics of identification of APs is not that it is unethical to get into someone else’s 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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head to decide whether some preferences are good and some are bad,
44
 but that even if some 
preferences pass the categorisation test and are labelled good preferences, there is no reason to believe 
that they represent an agentic individual. At the same time, as Oppenheim shows, those preferences 
that are construed to be adapted according to some subjective assessment could well be exercised by 
agentic individuals. The question therefore arises – how do we think about preferences in terms of 
agency in addition to preferences in terms of a conception of the good?     
 Arpaly is also of the opinion that it is worthwhile to speak of agency outside a Strawsonian 
framework, and in terms of responsiveness.
45
 To do so, she argues that praise or blame can be levied 
on someone’s non-deliberative choices and opinions, and we can suspend judgement about an agent’s 
motives while deciding whether to praise or blame her for her actions. This is where I part company 
with Arpaly. Based on discussions earlier in the article, I do not think that responsiveness should be 
thought about instrumentally in relation to praise or blame. Punishments and rewards – based on good 
choices and bad choices – operate within the framework of public good, and agency lies in responding 
to the levy of particular punishments and rewards as well as structures that formulate such 
punishments and rewards. Thus, while she engagingly and clearly speaks about the relationship 
between deliberation, judgement and responsibility, her work is not – contrary to the title of her book 
– an ‘inquiry into moral agency’. It is an inquiry into moral responsibility. The difference between 
adherence to responsibility and responsiveness to responsibility may be explained by analogously 
describing the difference between Law and the Rule of Law.  
It may appear that the terms ‘Law’ and ‘Rule of Law’ are interchangeable. However, there is a 
significant difference between the two.
46
 While providing a devastating critique of the privatisation of 
property through law in eighteenth century England, the historian E.P. Thompson simultaneously 
lauded the inherent value of the Rule of Law.
47
 The contemporary Marxist-anarchist anthropologist 
David Graeber argues along similar lines.
48
 The distinction is most clearly articulated and ferreted out 
by Krygier who argues that lawyers should not be trusted with the Rule of Law,
49
 focusing on the Rule 
of Law as a good independent of – and he argues that one should pains to keep them separate – Law. 
The primary distinction is that while Law establishes power, the Rule of Law keeps a check on it. The 
blurring of this distinction is what makes ‘Rule of Law initiatives’ by organisations such as the World 
Bank spurious. By way of an example, a Rule of Law initiative could be the establishment of a 
courthouse in a post-conflict State, but there is no reason to believe that this courthouse would provide 
a meaningful forum to contest power, rather than assist with its perpetuation. As noted earlier in the 
article, Krygier explains that the Rule of Law can be ‘felt’ in a society by virtue of whether individuals 
do not constantly feel subservient to arbitrary instances of power. Thus, formal legal institutions may 
seem transparent or democratic, but they do not necessarily assist in constituting a society that feels 
comfortable in recognising and contesting power. Admittedly, several properties of the Rule of Law 
need to be thought through (not least of which is what constitutes arbitrariness; something Krygier 
recognises) and the idea of extending the idea of power to discursive power and identifying implicit 
power structures requires detailed inquiry. But for the purpose of this article, I wish to highlight the 
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distinction between the construction and perpetuation of power of one hand, and a check on the 
exercise of power on the other.  
Drawing on this distinction, the law imposes responsibilities on people; scholars have rightly pointed 
out that this is why neuroscience or physicalism have limited explanatory power in providing an 
account of the life of the law,
50
 as law is concerned about responsibility. The Rule of Law, however, is 
more interested in how such responsibility may be assessed and negotiated. As to how this is done is 
not explained; Raz points out that the Rule of Law appears to have only a ‘negative value’ of keeping 
a check on power.
51
 Having said that, it was not for nothing that the Rule of Law consciousness 
allowed people to approach courts in England to question the exercise of power by legislative and 
executive institutions. Admittedly, courts are also prone to capture by specific interests and exercises 
of private power. But in a counterintuitive way, this is precisely where the development of an account 
of agency may be located – if a party can successfully use the court system to strategically negotiate 
the imposition of responsibility in particular instances, and even theoretically structurally de-
legitimise a government, then the party has legal agency. However if a party cannot do so – and to the 
extent that it cannot – it does not possess legal agency. As to how this agency is exercised is irrelevant 
to the fact of agency: a party may bribe judges, afford good lawyers or shape the law itself. Some 
means of exercising such agency may correspond with a conception of the good, and may then be 
categorised as moral agency. For instance, bribing a judge is generally not considered to be an 
instance of moral agency, but it seems that being able to afford a good lawyer is. Much like the 
identification of good preferences and bad, the assessment of how to exercise agency can only be 
legitimised by a claim to a conception of the good. Relativism does creep in with regard to the 
identification of good means to achieve good ends; this does not however affect the desirableness of 
the fact of agency. In relation to AP, when Sen says ‘discontent is replaced by acceptance; hopeless 
rebellion by conformist quiet’52 or when Elster has a problem with ‘the adjustment of people’s 
aspirations to feasible possibilities,’53 they are invoking a conception of agency, and find a problem 
with people merely adhering to rather than responding to situations. But could there be an objective 
account of agency as responsiveness? I turn to this issue in the following section.  
The exercise of agency  
To briefly recap, I started with the idea that a libertarian idea of freedom is prone to critique, and the 
CA has developed AP theory to apply a somewhat deterministic account to weed out some preferences 
that seem intuitively spurious. It was suggested that the identification of some preferences as ‘not real’ 
is a problematic endeavour, given that such identification can be damaging both to preferences that are 
identified as adaptive as well as those that are not. This questions the conceptualisation of AP itself. 
Khader shows that it might be worthwhile to maintain a conceptualisation of AP, and the standpoint 
we adopt to identify some preferences over others is a conception of the public good. While I agreed 
with this assessment, I sought to argue that such an account was not a helpful conceptualisation 
agency, a property that can be considered to be integral to all choices, whether they satisfy a 
conception of the good or not. A better way to think about spurious choices or non-deliberative 
choices is when such choices do not accommodate the operation of agency. To make this argument, I 
begun clarifying how agency may be conceptualised. In this regard, drawing an analogy with the 
difference between adhering to Law and responding via the Rule of Law, I disassociated agency from 
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adherence to responsibility, arguing instead that agency entails responsiveness to responsibility. Such 
an account, however, would not provide any guidance on how to locate and develop agency; what is 
needed is an anatomy of responsiveness that may be transpositionally observable, and it is this 
endeavour that I seek to commence in this section. 
 We usually associate responding with ‘answering’ through words or actions, and that suggests we 
deliberate and then act. But we have seen from the discussion on AP as well as Arpaly’s compatibilist 
account that we cannot take for granted that our words and actions are our own, and the same 
constraint would kick in when we respond. Responsiveness is different from the act of responding, as 
it implies an interest in the capacity to respond. Thus, we do not need to take for granted a conception 
of us being perfectly rational respondents, or that responses are generated in neutral conditions. 
Rather, being responsive to a particular situation or to meet the requirements of responsibility (legal, 
moral or otherwise) is inevitably informed by circumstances that are mostly unintelligible during an 
act of responding. Given the unintelligibility of informants of our responses, we could misinform or 
mislead ourselves by attempting to deliberate on the circumstances, and the link that might have to our 
actions.
54
  
The idea that the information-deliberation-judgement nexus is the sole or even primary indicator of 
agency has been questioned over the years, but has received substantial interest of late owing to 
philosophers trying to come to grips with the popular findings of cognitive and social psychologists 
regarding – as John Bargh and Tanya Chartrand would put it – the ‘unbearable automaticity of 
being.’55 My endeavour is not to rehearse tired irreconcilable issues regarding conscious agency and 
the operation of intuition, but to point out that (1) judgement through deliberation may not be a 
complete or sufficient basis for responsiveness, and (2) judgement through deliberation may prove to 
be a regressive step in cultivating responsiveness.
56
 Drawing on psychological studies on intuition, 
Richard Holton has argued that contrary to the popular belief that judgement precedes choice, it could 
well be that choices precede judgements; i.e. we retrospectively use words to legitimise or make sense 
of the choices we have already made.
57
 Within a responsibility paradigm, this means that we can be 
praised or blamed for actions we don’t deliberate on. For an agency paradigm, this implies that our 
responses are not necessarily mediated by deliberation. This seems like a disheartening statement, as 
we might have agency but such agency would be unintelligible to us; it is tempting to give in to the 
adage that ‘Luck Swallows Everything’58 or agree with one of Nussbaum’s respondents that destiny 
requires abusive marriages,
59
 and opt for subservience to higher powers. But I would stop short of 
being that fatalistic.  
To begin with, I have suggested that agency extends beyond deliberation, and needs to be cultivated in 
a responsive rather than adherence to responsibility paradigm. This is already a step forward from 
unhelpful theorising about authentic and inauthentic preferences. I now proceed to indicating how 
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responsiveness may be thought about in a ‘beyond instance-based deliberation’ framework. This 
would require a re-think of how deliberation is conceptualised, mediators that shape deliberation, and 
the possibility of agency without deliberation as an integral property. 
Transpositional agentic deliberation  
Unlike John Locke’s emphasis on deliberation as a value in itself; endorsed by contemporary action 
theorists who write on the exercise of practical reason and planning agency;
60
 I argue that deliberation 
may be considered a value in itself for well-being or for having a conception of the ‘real self’, but not 
necessarily for agency. As Holton shows, what might matter for agency is choice, but not choice 
arising out of pre-meditated deliberation. Holton implicitly introduces the element of time – he uses 
examples of quick decisions, or ‘deciding on your feet’ (quite literally, such as with respect to a 
fireman’s gut inclination). 61Arpaly is of the view that some non-deliberative instinctive judgements 
may be judged to be more moral than deliberated judgements, such as Huck Finn’s ability to transcend 
the racist discourse of his surroundings. So there are factors that shape choice, without having to 
influence the intermediate step of judgement. In both these accounts, however, there seems to be no 
framework for having access to choice without judgement. To situate this absence in Sen’s vocabulary, 
there is no transpositionally objective account of non-deliberative agentic choices. Such choices may 
be observed or blamed, but much like adaptive preferences, the factors that condition and inform such 
choices remain unintelligible.  
The way out identified by Paul Katsafanas is one of deliberatively having a hand on ‘drives’ (ala 
Nietzsche) that lead to particular choices.
62
 Thus, the way to have a hold on the habitual or the 
instinctive is to relate them to the general motivators or social forces that influence them. In this 
process, the element of control features by appreciating the objectivity of the general, rather than being 
blindsided by the unintelligible determinism of the particular. This way of reasoning would satisfy 
action theorists of a Bourdieusian bent (explicated further down in this section), where knowledge of 
how objective social fields shape the habitus should be where agency may be found. Even in this 
setup, relating the particular to the general entails: (1) the fact of interpretation: we assume that 
deliberative agency lies in interpreting the particular in light of the general, and (2) a retrospective 
interpretation of the particular, and how it fits the general, which allows for only an ex-post assessment 
of agency. Both the general and the particular are brought into the picture by trying to interpretatively 
have a grip on the good reasons that shape choices. For the relationship between good reasons and 
choices to be understood as acts of agentic deliberation, they need to have persuasive value for what to 
say or do for future events, or where some insight is gleaned regarding how deliberation works. In 
addition to the obvious ex-post issue, the difficulty is that the interpretative act may be an unhelpful 
delusion about the nature of the self or how the world works. Very simply, it may be a form of 
imagined agency without there being any objective responsiveness. For instance, I may think that the 
way I can engage morally in my everyday dealings is by relying on a preferred Holy Book before I 
make choices, and from my ex-post reflection on the relationship between the Holy Book and my 
actions, I come to the conclusion that some passages are more useful than others for future ex-ante 
actions. This conclusion is surely not sacrosanct. To begin with, I could be making it up. The reality 
could be completely different from my attribution, and my attribution could be little more than moral 
amusement or having a ‘sense of agency’. But I would like to suggest that even if we are inventing 
interpretative myths, they are not necessarily dysfunctional. We could well be able to respond to or 
contest moral responsibilities based on our myths. The construction of a language to name and order 
one’s experiences, even if they do not correspond with a physical or social language of truth, is 
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integral to agentic behaviour.
63
 The way we negotiate with the world is through functional illusions, as 
Sen would agree.  
Pierre Bourdieu would surely object to the above; per Bourdieu, when it comes to language or speech, 
it is the agency of social fields (predominantly the market) that defines the act in speech-acts, and all 
interpretation is simply a conduit for social fields to inform the habitus in which we operate. So not 
only does myth-making or ex-post interpretation not bestow the actors with agency, but that such 
myths are required pawns of powerful actors in social fields.
64
 But if the particular (be it conscious 
deliberation, unconscious action or ex-post interpretative speech-act about drives) is always a beast of 
social burden, then would agency be possible at all? We need to understand that in Bourdieu’s world 
carved out of Marxist theory, mastering any practice would only perpetuate the field that informs the 
habitus within which such practice is located. To respond to moral responsibility would be nothing 
more than a way of perpetuating the contours of such responsibility. Thus, if you are on top of your 
game, that means you=0, game=1.
65
 This might imply that I am again tediously bringing you back to 
the fatalistic strain that runs through this article. I would suggest otherwise, and I have a strange way 
to relate what we have been talking about to agency: we have no duty to revolt.
66
 There seems to be no 
reason why I have to change the social burden that I bear; rather I may wish to be a beautiful beast that 
bears this burden.
67
 In this case our agency does lie in the knowledge of the objectively social and the 
interpretation of the objectively social into particular acts; there may be no need to contest the 
embodiment of objectification that makes me spend on straightening my hair, engaging a plastic 
surgeon or cultivating a British accent, as long as such acts allow me to fulfil my social burdens.  
Agency would lie in deliberatively, unconsciously or interpretatively understanding objective social 
burdens and becoming the beast that satisfies such burdens. The Rule of Law would allow us to 
question the coherence and clarity of the burdens that we are expected to bear, as well as obstructions 
to the satisfaction of such burdens. To take this discussion to its natural end, Krygier argues that the 
Rule of Law ensures that we don’t have to go about our daily lives constantly afraid of a gun that 
might unexpectedly emerge and take us out (or any such arbitrary exercise of power). Now, it could be 
argued that we are allowed to live only because a governor or government needs someone to govern. If 
the government takes us out, then how would social fields perpetuate their existence and designation? 
Per Raz, the law should instrumentally serve us by satisfying what we have reason to value. Per 
Krygier, while we go about satisfying what we have reason to value, the Rule of Law keeps a check on 
the exercise of power by legal institutions. But neither would have an account of our instrumentality in 
perpetuating the reasons that social fields make us value. So, though we cannot be legally killed or 
discriminated against without reason, our survival and bounded ideas of discrimination constitute the 
habitus that is important for the perpetuation of social fields. Having said that, there is no reason to 
believe that we do not value survival or formal equality, and we would like to have agency to maintain 
such values.  
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Mediating dispositions   
The discussion on Bourdieusian theory may leave a bitter taste for the CA and AP theory. What about 
Sen’s suggestion that our choices may be deflated in the wake of oppression? How is the discussion in 
the section above useful for solving the problem of APs? In Bourdieu’s world, all preferences and 
actions are performative, and in one sense adaptive. However, from the discussion above, we can still 
see merit in identifying the objective moral good, the contours of moral responsibility, and how we 
can be on top of our game in satisfying such responsibility (rather than just adhering to it without any 
subjective interpretation of how it relates to us). But can the ‘social’ or common good itself be 
negotiated? In this respect, Sen would argue that knowing the objective social or attaining clarity of 
the power structures may provide us agency. However, there appears to be no clear basis for such a 
claim. Much like having second-hand knowledge of neural determinism or cognitive biases may have 
precious little agentic value, the same could be said for the social. Rather, the suggestion that the 
objective social is constructed provides space for the idea that the objectivity can be agentically 
reconstructed (per Judith Butler), or even that the social does not enjoy a static objectivity, and agency 
lies in constituting such objectivity (per Bruno Latour), as discussed below.  
Judith Butler tried to rescue the discursive agency of language from Bourdieu’s social field-habitus 
nexus by arguing that the reterritorialization of words such as ‘we’ or ‘women’ from their operation in 
dominant discourse has the potential to endow the new appropriation-by-interpretation with agency. 
The concentration on ‘potential’ rather than the automatic endowment with agency is highlighted 
because not all interpretations turn out to be effective expropriations. A new interpretation must be an 
authoritative one for an earlier objectivity to be displaced; it needs to have an ‘authority-producing 
effect’. Butler does not explain how an alternative ‘authority-producing effect’ may be identified or 
put in place that would engender a rearticulated social objectivity; we are left with ‘the exposure of the 
prevailing forms of authority and the exclusions by which they proceed.’
68
 This is not an insubstantial 
conclusion in itself; viewing the naturalised objectivity of the social as an instance of authority with its 
own preferences would allow rethinking a choice as something that is not natural, but the enactment of 
a ritual evidently circumscribed by authority, up for assessing as illegitimate and thereby amenable to 
moral change. It is not difficult to apply this way of reasoning to formal law: the authority of a 
constitution in the shadow of which laws are made is up for assessment, amendment and revision; the 
act of voting is conceptualised as performance of a ritual rather than an expression of freedom. I see 
Butler’s critique and situating the role of authority as an interpretive event for thinking about AP and 
agency in three significant ways:  
1. the fact of authority can be conceived as an essential property of ‘beings’ and ‘doings’, and 
how they are translated into achievements. The legitimacy of authority can undoubtedly be 
subjectively deliberated, retrospective interpretative myths may be constructed to assess their 
role, but could also be objectively studied. 
2. AP theory is concerned with deflated choices made under oppression, with the difficulty that 
such choices lack agency as agents lack deliberative access. The idea of a deflated choice is not 
too different from the psychological finding of ‘learned helplessness.’ The replicable mediator 
for learned helplessness; as Stanley Milgram had pointed out; is authority.
69
 Though recent 
research has sought to locate responsibility based on cultural identity and critique Milgram’s 
work on how people’s morality is predictably influenced by authority, it does not take away the 
key finding that authority mediates moral agency. To identify, reinterpret and replace authority 
seems to be the way to recover agency in making choices. 
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3.   In Raz’s account of legal authority, we assess the legitimacy of such authority by its capacity 
to achieve what people have reason to value. I suggest a more comprehensive account of 
authority is to see it as a property of constituting what people have reason to value.  
Admittedly, I used the word ‘mediator’ somewhat flippantly above to support the suggestion that 
authority is prevalent in agency. Bruno Latour, among others, would surely have a problem with such 
usage especially in a Bourdieusian context; drawing on semiotics, Latour argues that ‘mediator is all.’ 
By this, he seeks to argue that mediators confer agency onto people and things in any activity, and this 
way of thinking is reflected in his critique of Bourdieu’s work. Latour argues that there is no such 
thing as the objective ‘social’ that can be epistemologically predetermined before agency ‘happens.’
70
  
It is through association with myriad mediators that people and things acquire agency; thus, agency 
happens through the operation of actants and then such agency is simultaneously observed or 
retrospectively discovered.  
Without going into the tensions regarding Latour’s work, the idea that agency happens by association 
with mediators – and objects could also therefore possess agency – could imply that any endeavour to 
arrive at a p concept of human agency is misplaced. The response to this possibility would need me to 
stress on what I have hinted at before: agency serves a functional purpose in negotiating responsibility 
and moral spaces, and from this point of view, agency is social. To clarify, the fact that individuals 
operate in relational spaces and therefore are social does not mean that I support the ontological 
objectivity of social fields. I am partially inclined to agree with Latour that the social is influenced by 
associative mediators, but I am only interested in the ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ of individuals.  
In the Milgram experiments touched on above, people appeared to relax their moral compunctions in 
administering electric shocks when an authoritative figure in a ‘grey lab coat’ suggested otherwise. 
The ‘grey lab coat’ has now become a proverbial proxy for authority. Applying Latour, the grey lab 
coat would be a mediator that brings into play the aesthetics of the laboratory, teacher-student 
relationships, the authority of science, strains within psychological methods, among others. The 
concentration on mediation complements the critical strain that informs political psychology; take for 
instance the view that economic gain and political power may have been the motives of colonial 
expansion, but the actual journeys, translations and retentions of the colonial situation were brought 
about by mediating actants: ambivalent complictious-revolutionaries, religious interactions, 
hierarchies of knowledge.
71
 Epistemic mediation goes to the heart of discontents with AP theory: there 
is hardly any disagreement with the idea that deflated choices are not a good indicator of freedom, but 
the difficulty arises when a preferred universality of scholarly engagement mediates the way the 
agency of subjects is appreciated.  
The issue of intelligibility  
We touched upon the idea of using language to legitimise choices that we have already made, or what 
may be referred to as moral confabulation. Jonathan Haidt (2001) has concentrated on the idea of 
moral dumbfounding, i.e. how ex-post rationalisation rarely captures the operation of intuitions, 
emotions or unconscious judgements regarding moral action. The difficulty for agency seems to be the 
idea of unintelligibility, i.e. the operation of conscious deliberation does not seem to provide access to 
the reality of choices, and hence does not provide us opportunities with cultivating mechanisms for 
effective responsiveness. Added to this is the problem of misleading intelligibility where conscious 
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rationalisation may distort the operation of our unconscious choices in responding to responsibility.
72
 
A discussion on misleading intelligibility may be good way to approach the idea of intelligibility.  
There are times when we ‘feel’ we have agency that does not correspond with an outcome;
73
 and this 
may point out that there is something amiss. This intuition has been sought to be explored by both 
philosophers and cognitive psychologists by concentrating on the idea of ‘sense of agency’. As the 
phrase implies, there may be only a sense, without there actually being any real agency. Tim Bayne 
finds that this ‘sense’ may be nothing more than a sensory perception that produces agentive 
experiences, akin to other bodily perceptions such as hunger or thirst, and hence very different from 
judgement or implementation of judgement.
74
 The feeling of being in control that may not correspond 
with actually being in control may be something that we value in itself; take for instance the 
observation that if the science of free will is interpreted to mean that there is no self-control, then this 
interpretation has a negative effect on our respect for moral responsibility.
75
 At the same time, there is 
no basis for assuming that a ‘sense of agency’ may correspond with actual agency; it may result in 
very different attributes such as optimism biases or deflating assessments of self-worth. The problem 
of misleading intelligibility shows that real agency may be unintelligible. How do we go about dealing 
with the problem of misleading intelligibility and the unintelligibility of agency? The value of 
education is central to the CA, and the idea of developing a choice architecture is central to BLE. 
Combining the two – but significantly differing from both – we can think of a choice architecture that 
‘educates’ automatic behaviour. In this conceptualisation we move away from collapsing education 
into formal institutions as well as collapsing choice architecture into designs laid out by expert 
architects that agents subscribe to.
76
 Instead, we turn to scholarship on agentically educating moral 
intuitions.  
The case of a white policeman pulling out his gun unconsciously on a black man is a paradigmatic 
example of an immoral intuitive choice. Several versions of this example abound, and problematically 
even in relation to choices where there is opportunity for deliberation such as preferring male 
musicians for an orchestra,
77
 or not hiring male Indian students in Western universities because they 
are all rapists.
78
 How are we to handle these situations other than blaming individuals for their 
actions? Hanno Sauer argues in favour of the possibility of education of intuition through ex-post 
deliberative reasoning.
79
 He acknowledges the possibility of retrospective rationalisation or 
confabulation (akin to the sense of agency discussed above), but argues that it is possible for ex-post 
deliberation to affect future intuition through the operation of feedback loops. Though he speaks to 
different scholars when he reasons this way, this way of thinking is not too different from 
deliberatively shaping ‘drives’ that inform individual instances (discussed earlier).  
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In the initial years of conducting Implicit Association Tests (IATs), Mazharin Banaji and Kent 
Greenawald found that participants’ subjective opinions of being sensitive about race and gender were 
contradicted by their intuitive responses to matching words and pictures in IATs (or there was moral 
confabulation in their stated preferences). The researchers themselves found that despite repeated 
testing, they were not moral learners: ‘Awareness of hidden biases did not seem to help us to eradicate 
them.’
80
 The primary change they observed was when one of their students started 
‘counterstereotypic’ priming prior to these tests, whereby some groups were exposed to pictures of 
famous black people or women in masculine roles, as against those who were exposed to both 
stereotypes as well as neutral images such as insects or flowers.
81
 The results were a revelation for 
them, as at least temporally there seemed to be a change in intuitive moral responses. The conclusion 
they arrive at that the general problem with psychological experiments – that of the temporary effect 
of priming – is difficult to overcome, requiring a moral manipulation of individual instances.
82
 The 
way out they suggest may be drawn on a study that found IAT participants associate ‘female’ with 
‘leader’ and ‘math’ when students have sustained exposure to women faculty members. The 
conclusion seems to be that sustained exposure to counterstereotypes in social contexts would be the 
way forward in educating intuitions. 
Thus, transpositional objectivity does not lie in information broadening generally as Sen suggests, but 
in sustained exposure to countersterotypic actors in traditional roles of authority. It might appear that 
I am unnecessarily steering the discussion back to the relationship between agency, authority and 
mediation, but consider this: the fact of sustained exposure to countersterotypes would have been a 
sufficient explanation if mere exposure was successful. This is not the case as is borne out by the fact 
that mixed-race schooling or the mingling of sexes is not enough to shape intuitive responses away 
from conservative in-group morals. In keeping with the shaping of responses by authority indicated by 
the Milgram experiments, I suggest that the nature of exposure is of paramount importance.
83
 Drawing 
on the discussion on the influence of authority, and how such influence may be captured in processes 
of mediation, I suggest the efforts of choice-architects may be concentrated on exposing and providing 
tools for the negotiation of mediators and principals in positions of authority.  
Conclusion 
In the examples provided above, the animating question was how an individual can be gender and race 
sensitive given one’s sensitivity may be unintelligible, and deliberation may lead to misleading 
intelligibility. To be praised or blamed for being sensitive or insensitive is an important exercise in 
being held accountable for moral responsibility, but I hope it is clear that my thesis on agency involves 
identifying attributes of and developing responsiveness to responsibility rather than being held 
responsible. Such responsiveness would involve identifying and developing moral preferences and 
choices. But couldn’t preferences that reveal gender and race sensitivity also be considered as adaptive 
preferences; in other words, isn’t a moral preference adaptive? Following Khader, if gender and race 
sensitivity are attributes of a conception of the good, then preferences that correspond with such 
sensitivity are not deemed to be APs. Even if notions of the good differ over time and space, 
responding to such notions contextually is still responsive agency. But this brings us back to Bourdieu 
and Butler – how do we reinterpret the coordinates of public reason that sets the parameters of 
                                                     
80
 Banaji and Greenwald, supra note 77, at 149.  
81
 For a recent synthesis of her work on the subject, see Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Attitudes and Beliefs Adapt to 
Situations: A Decade of Research on the Malleability of Implicit prejudice, Stereotypes, and the Self-concept in 
Advances In Experimental Social Psychology (P.G. Devine and E.A. Plant eds., 2013). 
82
 Ibid, at 152. 
83
 I cannot at this stage suggest whether an imagined ‘sense of authority’ would be enough for us to steer our moral agency, 
primarily because there is no research on such a concept.  
Agency as responsiveness 
19 
responsibility? The explanation we have given so far is to be able to negotiate the mediators that shape 
agency, forms of authority that influence the operation of mediators and functionally interpret the 
associations that go with them. This may suggest that our agency is theoretically infinite, especially if 
the process of negotiation includes the possibility of rewriting the co-ordinates of public reason, or the 
rules of the game.  
Here I would like to remind the reader that our concern is moral agency, rather than agency 
simpliciter. Take for instance Milan Kundera’s explanation of the agency of a novelist. He argues that 
the greatest novelists are able to reinterpret the art of the novel, not to mention create mechanisms for 
the appreciation of a novel as an art form: ‘it is by tearing through the curtain of pre-interpretation that 
Cervantes set the new art going; his destructive art echoes and extends to every novel worthy of the 
name; it is the identifying sign of the art of the novel.’
84
  It is worth noting that for Kundera, the 
novelist’s agency is restricted to ‘the art of the novel’; this is why he takes pains to de-tether the art of 
the novel from the novelist’s biography as well as ‘social responsibility.’
85
 Thus the novelist’s agency 
is limited to the life of art, and to that extent is tethered. But where does responsiveness come in, and 
do we need to be concerned with a ‘moral’ qualifier? As Kundera says, the judgement as to whether a 
person is adjudged to be a novelist is decided by the vagaries of history, as well as the transcendence 
of the temporal. Time in this regard is associative: socially recognised authorities influence the 
kindness of time as they mediate the validation and visibility of the novelist; by way of an example, 
Kafka may have been lost to the world were it not for the visibility engendered by Max Brod within 
the German literature circuit. Further, while becoming a novelist, I would ordinarily be required to 
satisfy moral responsibility in general; even without going into the complexities of weighing 
preferences and situationist accounts of primary goods, I would need to behave civilly in public, look 
after family members (if I do not operate in an individualist culture, and relax the idea that dependent 
social relations are created out of free will)
86
 or add to the economy (the need to earn may even be a 
legal responsibility
87
). To return to AP, it may seem that a novelist’s agency is morally less interesting 
than the agency of a submissive wife. I disagree, and this is why I think the idea of AP provides a 
‘wound’ in the CA to allow an inquiry into agency. I may have had, for instance, a terrible math 
teacher at school, and received undue encouragement
88
 from my struggling poet-father. I convinced 
myself as a result that I am capable of being only a novelist. Accordingly, I may have a strong ‘sense 
of agency’ when I see my words on paper; I am also happiest not when I work for a living or sing the 
national anthem or have sex, but when I write a chapter that may possibly be lost to the world, or not 
fit into a canonical idea of what the novel should be. Following Katsafanas and Sauer, I would use 
‘feedback loops’ to decide whether I should be a novelist and how I can simultaneously balance this 
vocation with the pursuit of other activities that make up the common good. I hope I have been able to 
show that it is possible for a transpositional observer to adopt objective standpoints in relation to 
responsive agency: the role of authority, mediators in general, privileged interpretive associations, 
potential to contest responsibility. The ambivalent novelist is left to her subjective devices to create 
and invoke associations that allow negotiation and replacement of mediators.  
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Finally, with respect to the constraints of morality on infinite agency, I take a step back and see what 
some of the scholars we have discussed are getting at. The CA approach itself was sparked off by Sen 
when he critiqued ‘utilitarian equality, total utility equality and Rawlsian equality’ for providing an 
insufficient account of equality.
89
 In BLE scholarship the primary justification for ‘soft paternalism’ 
for shaping people’s choices is not because people are flawed (that is the finding of behavioural 
economics, but is not the normative basis of BLE) but because people’s choices are inevitably 
influenced by forces that are discursively more powerful than their own deliberation. At the cost of far 
too liberal a reinterpretation, BLE scholarship is motivated by the value of people being equally free to 
make themselves better off. I suggest therefore that unlike agency for other purposes, moral agency 
inevitably operates in the shadow of equality. All forms of moral agency operate in the shadow of the 
value of equality, but they do not necessarily have to adhere to a particular interpretation of it. 
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